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Digitalising City Governance in Russia:
The Case of the ‘Active Citizen’ Platform
DARIA GRITSENKO & ANDREY INDUKAEV
Abstract
This essay examines the role of civic tech in contemporary Russian governance through a data-driven analysis
of the ‘Active Citizen’ platform deployed in Moscow. It shows that the way in which polls are conducted on
the platform has various consequences, from serving the city administration’s PR needs to shuffling the power
balance in various policy areas and effectively disempowering certain stakeholder groups, as well as helping
the administration to increase control over a policy domain. At the same time, some platform uses actually
empower citizens by engaging them in decision-making and offering grounds for further mobilisation.
DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY HAS AFFECTED GOVERNANCE at all levels—from supranational to
local—by allowing new participatory formats. This is particularly true in the emerging realm
of civic technology, or ‘civic tech’ (Dunleavy et al. 2006; Graeff 2018). We contend that, at
its most simple level, governance refers to ‘any mode of co-ordination of inter-dependent
activities’ (Jessop 1998, p. 29), aimed at solving coordination problems in and across a
wide range of social systems. Participatory governance, in turn, can be understood as the
direct participation of citizens in dealing with the policy issues that affect them (Hertting
& Kugelberg 2017). Civic tech usually comes in the form of an online or mobile
application that allows citizens to participate in public policy through consultations,
opinion polling, ratings, requesting repairs, complaints, participatory budgeting and other
similar forms of engagement directed towards the public good (Graeff 2018). While the
use of civic tech has been promoted by a variety of actors, governments are usually the
key actors: they receive inputs provided via the applications, take part in the deliberations
that civic tech enables, and increasingly assume the role of civic tech platforms’
developers and owners.
The use of digital technology in democratic governance is commonly associated with the
promise of increased efficiency in public administration (Dunleavy et al. 2006) and the
political empowerment of citizens (Mossberger et al. 2007). The spread of civic tech has
brought new life to the participatory governance promise to extend citizens’ role beyond
that of ‘voter or watchdog’ to ‘direct deliberative engagement’ (Fischer 2012, p. 458) and
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thus to enhance governments’ legitimacy and effectiveness and to promote social justice
(Fung 2015). Yet, the capacity of civic tech to enhance the democratic quality of
governance remains a matter of empirical investigation and theoretical debate (Cardullo
& Kitchin 2019; Deseriis 2020).
In recent years, the spread of digital technology in authoritarian regimes has added extra
complexity to the theory and practice of citizen participation in governance. For instance,
China—which understands citizen participation as a tool to bolster regime legitimacy (He
& Warren 2011)—has embraced digital technology to develop new participatory
instruments. Recent studies of e-petitioning (Jiang et al. 2019) and online public
consultations (Kornreich 2019) in China have created a benchmark for studying the role
of civic tech in authoritarian regimes, offering empirical evidence that digital technologies
of participation can improve the quality and responsiveness of governance. Thus, in
authoritarian regimes participatory governance could be an attractive alternative to
democratic empowerment via ‘votes and rights’ as the Chinese example suggests. Yet,
despite its burgeoning civic tech, the political regime remains strictly autocratic.
Current research on the role of government-sponsored civic tech in Russian governance
provides inconclusive results (Wijermars 2020). In contrast to the visible success of citizen-
led digital initiatives in a set of policy areas (Ermoshina 2014), government-sponsored tools
are widely seen as, at best, maintaining the status quo (Chugunov et al. 2017). Toepfl (2018)
studied a case in which federal authorities introduced internet voting to change the procedure
for the staffing of an important advisory body, the President’s Council on the Development
of Civil Society and Human Rights, showing that the digital tool used by the authorities
enabled them to disempower the opposition. Other studies also document civic tech
misuse,1 in particular, with the aim of increasing governmental control over civic
activities (Asmolov 2015). At the same time, a growing number of studies show that
governance processes can, despite the multiplicity of constraints related to rent-seeking
and tight political control, be open to civic input via government-owned ‘analogue’
formats (Aasland et al. 2016; Kropp et al. 2018; Bindman et al. 2019; Owen & Bindman
2019). Does this mean, contrary to its offline counterparts, that civic tech is not an
exception to Russia’s ‘bad governance’ tendencies2 but, rather, contributes to civic
disempowerment, despite the expectations of ‘digital democracy’ advocates?
This essay presents an exploratory analysis of the most notable Russian civic tech
platform, ‘Active Citizen’ (Aktivnyi Grazhdanin—AC) deployed in Moscow, to better
understand the role of civic tech in contemporary Russian governance. We analysed the
data of polls held via the AC platform from its launch in 2014 until September 2019,
conducted five interviews and performed extensive analysis of media, official documents
and previous research (Horgan & Dimitrijević 2019). We also observed platform
functioning by using it ourselves. Drawing on these data, our analysis follows two
sequential steps. First, we offer a panoramic view of the platform’s functions through
analysing the matters being voted on as well as what types of input the votes solicit.
What we discover is the prevalence of inconsequential questions with only a few
1For example, see Gel’man (2016) on the Russian Public Initiative.
2See Gel’man, this issue.
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exceptional policy areas in which citizen input may have substantial consequences. Second,
we combine our vote analysis with data from interviews, media and previous research to
outline the main uses of the platform by the city administration. We suggest the
importance of the platform as a PR tool, as well as an instrument mobilised with, at best,
uneven success to deal with idiosyncratic symbolic matters, such as street naming. We
then demonstrate how the platform is used to promote the interests of key actors in the
governance networks of some policy domains, while ultimately reducing citizens’ overall
influence. We also demonstrate how consequential votes on public services, while
primarily contributing to the city administration’s quest for control over sectoral elites in
corresponding policy domains, also gives city residents a say on some issues that matter
for them. We conclude that citizen empowerment can be considered as an unintended
consequence of the AC platform deployment.
The essay is structured as follows. The second section describes Moscow’s governance
structure and the place of the AC platform within it. The third section introduces the data
and methods used in this study. The fourth section presents the results of the empirical
analysis of the quantitative data, while the fifth section draws on a description of key
analysed cases to show the various ways in which the platform is used by the
administration and city residents. Lastly, we offer our conclusions and outline an avenue
for further investigations.
Background: Active Citizen in Moscow city governance and politics
Moscow is the capital of Russia, a highly centralised country, and has significant political,
economic and symbolic weight in Russian politics. With a population of approximately
12.5 million people (2017, registered residents), a gross regional product (GRP) of
approximately R15 trillion (2017, approx. €212 billion), a budget income of around R2.1
trillion (2018) and the special status of a federal city,3 Moscow’s control over significant
resources and power gives the mayor a lot of political weight on the federal level. At the
same time, Moscow is a showcase for Russia (Argenbright 2013), and the mayor,
currently Sergey Sobyanin, is responsible for making sure the city is governed in a way
that fits its status as the country’s most developed city, as well as a competitive global
city. Moscow is expected to symbolise economic development, be politically stable and
connect Russia to the rest of the world. In its quest to develop its status as a modern,
global city, the Moscow administration actively engages with technology to create new
interfaces for interaction with its citizens. AC is a civic tech platform created by
Moscow’s mayoral office in 2014 as a key piece in Moscow’s digital city infrastructure.
AC is a high-profile initiative that has made news headlines multiple times as a subject of
praise and controversy. According to the ACwebsite, the platform’s mission is ‘gathering the
opinions’ of citizens, and ‘engaging’ them in ‘the life of the city and the making of decisions
to be implemented by the city government’.4 The polls conducted on the platform focus
3Moscow is one of three Russian ‘cities of federal importance’ that are independent federal subjects. The
other two are St Petersburg and Sevastopol.
4‘O proekte’, available at: ag.mos.ru/info#, accessed 10 October 2019. Translation by the authors.
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primarily on city events and the development, upgrade and beautification of public spaces, as
well as the collection of feedback on the Moscow government’s policy proposals and
strategies (Horgan & Dimitrijević 2019). With more than two million active users, it is
often presented as a modern and efficient tool for engaging citizens in city management
using the most up-to-date technology—namely, blockchain5—to ensure the transparency
and legitimacy of its procedures. The use of blockchain has been praised as a great step
in promoting ‘blockchain democracy’, but it has also been criticised by some experts
(Holder 2017; Zionts 2018). AC is the most actively used of Moscow’s state-sponsored
civic tech platforms. In comparison, as of 2019, ‘Crowdsourcing’ had 175,000 registered
users, ‘Nash Gorod’ 1.4 million and AC more than 2.5 million,6 which makes it the most
popular of the three. Furthermore, the AC platform has been deemed a great success at
the bureaucratic level and is now slated to be rolled out across all Russian regions
(Golunov 2018). While AC is positioned as a tool to improve city governance through
citizen input and to empower citizens in giving them a say in city affairs, the effects of
this civic tech platform should be viewed in the larger context of Moscow’s city
governance and politics.
Moscow politics has a competitive dimension that influences local governance. As
Moscow is a showcase for the political regime, the elected mayor, although not
challenged in truly competitive elections, is expected to contribute to regime legitimacy
through performance and other available means, including engagement with democratic
practices. Many Muscovites support opposition politics, as was made evident by protest
movements in Moscow, in particular the anti-electoral fraud protests in winter 2011–2012.
Interestingly, along with its broader political demands of ‘Rossiya bez Putina’ (‘Russia
without Putin’), the 2012 protests strongly featured slogans in favour of local
government, such as ‘Nash gorod—Nam reshat’!’ (‘Our city—Our decision!’) and ‘Za
samoupravlenie—bez samoupravstva!’ (‘For self-government—without arbitrariness!’)
(Gorokhovskaia 2018, p. 589). In 2013, the city administration even allowed an
opposition politician,7 Alexei Naval’nyi, to compete in the mayoral elections, in which he
won 27% of the vote, despite administrative pressure and possible falsifications.
It is difficult to say whether letting Naval’nyi participate in the elections brought
legitimacy to the mayor. Yet, it showed to federal authorities the incumbent government’s
capacity to contain contention and unrest while avoiding blatant forms of oppression.
Furthermore, after 2013, the support for opposition politics at the local level kept
growing, suggesting the revival of local politics in Moscow both as an arena for
opposition politicians with federal ambitions and as a place of local civic activism
(Zhuravlev et al. 2020). One manifestation of this twofold process is seen in municipal
elections. Gorokhovskaia (2018) argued that restrictions on civil society and the
unresponsive nature of Russia’s hybrid authoritarian regime prompted some civil society
actors in Moscow to enter organised municipal politics. In 2012, about 200 opposition
5Blockchain is a distributed record system that is, by design, resistant to modification.
6As reported on platforms’ websites: https://crowd.mos.ru/, https://gorod.mos.ru/ and https://ag.mos.ru,
accessed 10 October 2019.
7Some media reported that the decision was made at the federal level and that the Sobyanin administration
was reluctant to the idea of letting Naval’nyi compete (Rubin 2020).
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candidates ran for municipal offices; in 2017 the number increased to roughly 1,000, with
opposition candidates winning one quarter of all seats and forming a majority in 17
municipal councils (Gorokhovskaia 2018, p. 590). In a continuation of this trend, the
2019 elections to the Moscow Duma attracted numerous opposition candidates and
sparked the significant mobilisation of Muscovites after the Moscow City Election
Commission refused to register most of the independent opposition candidates.8 The
massive wave of protests in Moscow that followed, now known as the ‘Moscow
protests’,9 faced a crackdown from the authorities and ultimately tarnished the image of
Sobyanin as a progressive and responsive mayor. These events could be seen to
symbolise the failure of the experiments in electoral opening as a source of administrative
legitimacy.
Despite quite animated electoral politics in the city, the primary means the city
administration uses to bolster legitimacy is governance: first, by demonstrating its success
in managing the city and, second, by experimenting with instruments to make governance
processes responsive to citizen input. These objectives are pursued via governance
practices dominated by a top-down approach: ‘Moscow’s city government resembles a
mini power vertical, with executive authority—in the form of the mayor and his
administration—supported by lower-level administrative structures: the prefektura at the
level of administrative okrugs and uprava at the raion level’ (Gorokhovskaia 2018,
p. 597). Since 1991, Moscow mayors have been directly elected, with a hiatus between
2004 and 2013, when they were appointed, and perform three functions: heading the
federal unit, serving as city mayor and heading the municipal government. The highest
executive power in Moscow lies within its government, which is formed and headed by
the mayor, deputy mayors, heads of departments and prefects. The Moscow Duma is
responsible for all the functions of the legislature as a permanent elected representative
body but leaves most of the decision-making power to the mayor, as the Duma has
limited mandate to affect the budget. At the lowest government level, Moscow has a
system of 125 municipalities, two municipal towns and 19 settlements, representing local
self-government. The deputies of the municipalities are elected by the citizens but have
an extremely narrow mandate, mainly limited to input and oversight in the areas of urban
planning (construction, repair, beautification) and socio-economic issues, and very limited
resources (municipal budgets constitute less than 2% of the city’s consolidated budget).
The mayor holds the central position in the administrative system without being
constrained by self-governance institutions. As a result, the general design of interaction
between the city administration and its citizens implies an active, ‘benevolent’,
paternalistic authority taking care of everything and knowing the best way to do it, with
‘passive’ citizens simply accepting these decisions.
8‘Bol’shinstvu nezavisimykh kandidatov v Mosgordumu otkazano v registratsii’, rbk.ru, 16 July 2019,
available at: https://www.rbc.ru/politics/16/07/2019/5d2c8b3b9a794799a7c7d413, accessed 31 October
2019.
9‘Hundreds Detained in Moscow Protest for Fair Election’, Euronews, 3 August 2019, available at: https://
www.euronews.com/2019/08/02/muscovites-vow-to-protest-again-despite-police-detentions, accessed 31
October 2019.
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While city administration has the capacity to carry out policies without much constraint,
the governance configurations still vary across different policy domains. In the 1990s and
early 2000s, the administration developed a symbiotic relationship with economic elites,
notably the construction industry. This led, in the context of limited space and high prices
for real estate, to pervasive ‘pinpoint’ construction10 and the destruction of historical
monuments, as well as hostile and intimidating approaches to local residents and activists
who oppose construction projects.11 In general, the urban development was seen as
largely unconnected with Muscovites’ actual needs. Sergey Sobyanin, appointed in 2010,
tried to show himself as a progressive mayor open to citizens and their grievances. This
ambition, initially aligned to President Dmitrii Medvedev’s promise of modernisation,
was reinforced by the protests in 2011–2012, resulting in policies catering to the ‘creative
class’ believed to be the driving force of protest (Zhelnina 2014; Kalyukin et al. 2015). In
his push for more progressive urban development, Sobyanin relied primarily on the
co-optation of the new generation of professionals. At the same time, the administration’s
close ties with economic elites, such as the construction lobby, were maintained, as made
evident by the launch of the Renovation programme in 2017 (Programma renovatsii).12
However, the administration wielded more control and imposed more constraints on the
construction industry’s appetites, cancelling many of the controversial projects inherited
from the previous mayor, Yurii Luzhkov.
Another area of reform prioritised by Sobyanin was that of public services, such as
secondary education and healthcare. Known by the term ‘optimisation’ and intensified
after 2013, these reforms promoted a service-centric approach balancing between
reducing costs and increasing user satisfaction.13 Importantly, the reforms also increased
the power of the administration vis-à-vis sectoral professionals, which led to widespread
dissatisfaction among the latter, with occasional public conflicts, as reported by the media
(Grigor’yev 2015; Kozlova 2020). In sum, while characterised by a top-down approach,
Moscow governance varies significantly across policy domains—from borderline
clientelist arrangements in the construction sector to power struggles in the sectors that
are subject to reform.
As mentioned in the discussion of Moscow’s place in federal politics and Muscovite
political life, the city administration cares about legitimacy and seeks popular support of
its rule. The main tactic of the administration is to gain support via popular urban
development projects, improved public services and the avoidance of controversial
construction projects. To achieve these ends, the administration also puts additional
emphasis on its communication and interaction with citizens. First, significant effort has
been made to promote the positive coverage of the administration’s activities through
both traditional and social media. A piece of investigative journalism showed that, in
addition to maintaining its own media outlets and having close relationships with federal
state media, the Moscow administration allocated a significant part of its budget to paid-
10‘Pinpoint’ construction (tochechnaya zastroika) is residential housing construction on infill lots inside
existing neighbourhoods.
11See Khmelnitskaya and Ihalainen in this issue.
12See Khmelnitskaya and Ihalainen in this issue.
13For a discussion of comparable reforms at country level, see Holm-Hansen et al. (2019).
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for content in the media and engaged in quite sophisticated activities on social media. These
include using ‘astroturfing’—the imitation of genuine civic support by fake or incentivised
social media users—as well as the manipulation of news aggregators such as Yandex.News
(Kovalev 2017). This spectacular PR effort has gone together with more substantive changes
too. The portal Nash Gorod (gorod.mos.ru) offers Muscovites the opportunity to report on
local urban management problems such as potholes. The portal is actively used and the
administration claims that it has increased the quality of governance.14 It is important to
note that this instrument is also seen by the administration as a response to opposition
activities. As reported by the media, Anastasia Rakova—deputy mayor in the Sobyanin
administration and a key supporter of governmental civic tech in Moscow—said that
Nash Gorod has succeeded as an alternative to the online citizen projects launched by the
opposition, such as rosyama.ru—Naval’nyi’s pothole reporting system (Ermoshina 2014;
Sinergiyev & Bekbulatova 2016, p. 6). Furthermore, Rakova has attributed even greater
importance, in terms of preventing conflicts between citizens and the administration and
in increasing the legitimacy of the mayor’s decisions, to another civic tech project: AC.
The remainder of this essay focuses exclusively on this emblematic platform.
Methodology
Data
For this study, we pulled data from several online sources and conducted five interviews. The
information about the functionality of the AC platform was primarily obtained through
scraping the data available on the portal website ag.mos.ru. We mainly used the website
section ‘Results’, where the administration systematically reports on the activities that were
carried out on the basis of input from polls on AC. As of 2019, this section included a few
thousand entries, all formatted in the same way. Each entry in the ‘Results’ section contains
the following information: the dates of the poll; the title and subtitle of the entry; an
‘Outcome’ subsection reporting the total number of voters and the percentage of votes that
each answer received; and a ‘Decision’ subsection with a textual description of what was
done with the poll results, sometimes including photographs or infographics. We scraped
all the textual information using rvest and RSelenium packages in R.15 Most of the entries
refer to polls that were carried out at the district level. We focused only on the entries
corresponding to the polls carried out at the city-wide level. As a result, we obtained a
dataset of 763 entries, corresponding to the polls that took place from May 2014 to August
2019. We will refer to these entries as ‘polls’ for the remainder of this essay.16
14‘Vodin klik’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 24 April 2014, available at: https://rg.ru/2014/04/24/mosportal-site.
html, accessed 28 May 2021.
15The website allows scraping, according to robots.txt file.
16It is important to note that several decisions could be made in response to the same poll. For example, if a
poll included multiple questions on how to make the operations of a municipal health centre (poliklinika) more
efficient, each action, such as a change in working hours or the opening of a playroom for children, could be
reported as separate decisions in the ‘Decision’ subsection. Thus, the basic unit of analysis in our research is
not a poll but a decision, defined as an action by the city administration that was influenced by a poll and
reported on the Active Citizen website in the ‘Decision’ subsection of the ‘Results’ section.
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Information on the structure and operations of the Moscow government was acquired
from the official website of the mayor and government of Moscow.17 This website is a
blend of city news, an event calendar and a government information portal that lists
public services; it explains the government’s structure and mandate and contains a
document database of administrative decisions and city laws that can be freely accessed.
We used the Moscow Open Budget website18 to extract information about the structure of
the city budget, with a special focus on the budgets allocated to the various departments
of the city government and to the state programmes implemented in Moscow. We used
the official website of the Moscow Duma to review the legislative work of this assembly
for the period 2014–2019, with a particular focus on the variety and scope of policy
issues this representative body deals with.
The data we collected have the advantage of providing a comprehensive ‘panoramic’
overview of the uses of AC on the level of the entire city. However, the data have
significant limitations. The data do not include any information on the specific context of
the issues that spurred the polls and thus provide little evidence for the effects of the use
of AC. Moreover, some widely debated uses of AC, such as in the Renovation
programme, are not reported in the website’s ‘Results’ section. To overcome these
shortcomings, we complemented the collected data with diverse qualitative data. First, we
looked at the coverage of the AC platform in online and news media, including popular
digital editions, as well as mentions of the platform on the independent petitions website
change.org. Second, we conducted long, semi-structured interviews with an early
developer of the platform and with a Muscovite concerned by the Renovation programme
(Moscow, June 2018), as well as three short, issue-focused interviews regarding the AC
vote on school vacations (by phone, May–June 2020).19 Finally, we relied on the insights
and interviews presented by Horgan and Dimitrijević (2019) who conducted qualitative
activist research on the AC platform in summer 2018.
Methods
At the stage of data analysis, we set two research objectives. The first was to describe the
general organisation of the platform, identify the policy issues appearing on the AC
platform, classify them in relation to city government mandates and outline the variety of
governance subsystems where the platform is used. The second was to explore the types
of input collected via votes as well as how this input is used by the administration within
different governance contexts, while also accounting for citizens’ reactions. To fulfil these
objectives, we deployed a mixed-methods approach to the analysis of the data we
collected. To analyse types of policy issues that appear on AC and link them to specific
17Ofitsial’nyi sayt Mera Moskvy, available at: www.mos.ru, accessed 31 October 2019.
18Otkrytyi byudzhet goroda Moskvy, available at: www.budget.mos.ru, accessed 31 October 2019.
19We performed subject searches through informal channels and got interviews on the condition of
anonymity. The key subject selection criterion was involvement in the development of AC or in two
selected issues that were voted about on the platform: the Renovation programme and the change of
school vacation schedule in Moscow. We will use pseudonyms instead of reals names and omit any details
that allow for identifying the interviewee.
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governance subsystems, we pursued a thematic classification of decisions based on a
predefined set of categories. To explore the types of citizen input, we classified the
decisions according to the type of poll that led to the decision. To situate the usages of
the votes in governance contexts, we focused on a limited set of exemplary cases.
Since 2018, all the decisions published on the website have been explicitly labelled by the
administration as belonging to one of 17 categories, such as public health, education, parks,
construction or city events. These categories largely correspond to the local administration’s
mandate and can thus be mapped, with some exceptions, onto the organisational structure of
the city administration. As explicit labels for thematic categories were only available for
2018–2019, we used a simple machine-learning algorithm and human validation to label
the whole dataset. The data for 2018–2019 decisions, with the category information, were
used as the training dataset. We applied a multinomial Naïve Bayes algorithm to train the
classifier, using decision, title and subtitle as features. The classifier achieved an accuracy
of 0.6 for 17 categories. After applying the classifier to the rest of the unlabelled data, we
performed manual validation for the entire dataset. The classification procedure has a
limited accuracy: even when the categories are specified by the portal administrators, they
do not always describe the policy issues raised in the poll in a precise manner. However,
the resulting categorisation quality is sufficient to pursue our research objectives. Using
these categories in the analysis gives us an opportunity to account for both the thematic
domain of a poll (that is, the policy issue at stake) and the administrative unit, in most
cases a city administration department, in charge of this policy domain.
The type of input that civic tech platforms collect, and in particular, how consequential
the input is, depends on what kind of questions are being asked. Through close readings
of a random subset of the data we established a list of six poll types launched on the AC.
First, there are ‘symbolic polls’ from which decisions are made about symbols, designs or
names, such as the name of a new metro line or the colour it will have on the metro map.
Second, there are ‘ranking polls’ such as polls to determine the best teacher, doctor or the
most popular city park. Third are polls related to decisions on temporary or one-time
activities or services provided by the city administration; for example, a programme of
events to take place at the local library or the musicians to be invited to a free city
concert. The fourth group of polls is on long-term services, such as the working hours of
a health centre. The fifth type of polls includes questions about physical objects and
material infrastructure, for example, asking citizens for input on the location of a new
public service office or the equipment to be installed there. Sixth, some polls are devoted
to deciding on rules, such as the appropriate time for noisy renovation activities in private
apartments. To determine the type of poll, we first annotated 100 decisions manually, then
trained a Naïve Bayes classifier on these data, applied the classifier to the rest of the data
and, finally, validated the results manually. We used the title, subtitle and the decision
content as features for the classifier, achieving an accuracy of 0.64 on this six-class
classification task.
To assess the patterns of platform-use across policy areas and corresponding governance
subsystems, we calculated the number of voters per thematic category per poll type. As
already noted, a unique poll can lead to multiple decisions, so that merely summing up
the number of voters reported for each decision would lead to a significant
overestimation. Extra data processing was done to move from an individual decision to a
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poll as a unit of analysis. Using the poll start and end dates and the number of voters, we
identified all decisions corresponding to a single poll and aggregated them to keep only
one record per vote.20 This quantitative information was then combined with the official
available data on the Moscow administration’s operations, such as the budgets of the
various departments.
Having established a ‘panoramic’ view on the kinds of citizen input collected in specific
governance subsystems, we continued with the exploratory analysis of the uses of citizen
input in selected areas, focusing on a limited number of cases. To do that we triangulated
data from interviews, available information from social and traditional media, and
existing research on the AC platform in Moscow.
The design and main characteristics of the ‘Active Citizen’ platform
Platform design and management
The design of the platform and the way it is managed by the city administration set the
general framework for the platform’s operations. The platform is available via both a
traditional website and a mobile app. The app can send push-notifications to users, asking
them to vote. A poll can also include visual materials and ‘expert opinions’ on the issue
to educate and inform voters. The minimal requirement for registration on the platform is
having a Russian mobile phone number. The votes can be ‘city-wide’ or ‘territorial’. To
participate in the latter, a user has to input their address in their profile information. One
person can list up to four addresses: their official registration, their de facto dwelling,
their place of work and their place of home ownership. While this information is not
checked, a user cannot change their addresses more than three times a month. The
administration has gradually increased the possible uses of AC, adding a ‘public hearing’
function and an ‘owner assembly’ function for apartment buildings. These two types of
votes require users to prove their address.
The city administration has absolute control over the selection of issues polled on the
platform and how they are framed, including the formulation of the questions and the
answer options (all polls are conducted as multiple-choice questions). Likewise, the use
of poll results is controlled by the administration. Citizens or other social actors cannot
submit questions to AC, and it is not directly integrated with other city platforms open to
citizen input, such as crowd.mos.ru. Almost every vote has the option, ‘this should be
decided by experts’; not having an opinion is not an option.
Voting is rewarded in the form of points that can be exchanged for services, such as Metro
rides or museum tickets. This feature is highly problematic as it may compromise the results’
objectivity. A piece of data journalism by Novaya gazeta, titled ‘I will sell my vote for a
sweatshirt’, used individual-level voting data to provide convincing evidence that many
users vote for issues on which they have no opinion (Zayakin & Smagin 2018). For
20Some polls, however, included multiple questions, often of different types, which led to a situation in
which the same poll was used in decisions mobilising different types of participation. In such cases, we
considered decisions of different type as belonging to different polls.
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example, a large number of users in various parts of Moscow evaluated the upgrades made to
city parks. The parks are spread out across the city and it is highly improbable that so many
voters visited them all and had an opinion on the quality of the renovation. Moreover, a
significant share of voters with no opinion on a polled issue can increase the poll
organiser’s discretionary capacity to skew the vote outcome via phrasing of questions and
answer options, as well as the order of answer options.
There is no oversight of the city administration’s interpretation of poll results or the
decisions it makes based on these interpretations. In general, the most popular choice
guides decisions yet, occasionally, less popular choices are also taken into consideration.
Some polls do not lead to any action, as seen in the ‘Results’ section, even for votes held
many years before the study. The choice between the options, which is already framed by
the administration, is then reinterpreted during the implementation phase by the
administration, thus solidifying its almost complete control over the platform’s operations
and uses.
The management of the platform is not completely transparent either, but there are many
features that allow a level of traceability for its activity. First, all the votes are saved; they are
available online and can be found, albeit with some skill and effort. Second, since the second
half of 2015, the vote page has provided detailed vote statistics, including a temporal and
spatial distribution of the votes. These data can be used to detect irregularities in votes,
and some activists and journalists have used them in this way.21 The very existence of
these data limits, to some extent, the possibility of the platform being manipulated.
Moreover, every user can check that their vote was properly counted. In short, the city
administration has wide discretionary power over the platform’s design and management,
but a certain level of transparency is built in.
Types of issues appearing on ‘Active Citizen’
Our first empirical research objective was to explore the poll data to identify policy issues
and the types of votes most prominent on the AC platform. We first classified the
decisions into 17 thematic categories, and then mapped these categories onto the
departments of the city government to better understand how they relate to the city
government’s mandate. Except for the ‘City Events’ category, which has a generic
character, since events can be organised by a variety of departments, the polls could be
linked to a particular department. The opposite does not hold true: not every department
of the city administration can be related to a thematic category, meaning that not all of
them appear to use AC to interact with citizens.
To explore which issues were typically polled on AC, we analysed the distribution of
votes against the decision categories (see Table 1). Consequently, we can not only state
the number of times a certain issue type has been put onto the agenda but also reveal how
much traction it generated on the platform. The category that received the most votes cast
21‘Aktivnyi grazhdanin’. Neud po vsem stat’yam’, Lomonosovskii MO, available at: https://medium.
com/@lomonosovskiy/активный-гражданин-неуд-по-всем-статьям-cd996ecc5132, accessed 1 September
2020.
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TABLE 1
NUMBER OF VOTES ON ACTIVE CITIZEN BY THEMATIC CATEGORY AND TYPE OF POLL IN THOUSANDS (2014–2018), BUDGETS OF






Total votes by thematic
category
Budget of an organisational unit
in charge
Tourism 0 0 0 406 180 0 585 –
Information
technology
0 157 0 221 0 289 668 49,239
Economic
development
0 0 131 0 554 0 686 16,459
Veterinary 235 0 564 0 0 0 799 644
Commerce 657 270 0 0 0 0 928 13,026
Social security 0 0 1,495 232 0 210 1,937 277,771
Cultural heritage 0 803 768 43 770 0 2,385 4,143
Construction 535 113 1,222 0 414 426 2,709 524,824
Public services 240 591 0 1,585 568 105 3,089 351
Sport 434 0 2,588 0 0 274 3,296 32,705
Nature and
environment
227 211 2,932 21 0 18 3,410 9,795
Culture 397 1,328 1,477 2,478 743 1,182 7,605 60,662
Transportation 454 1,523 393 1,901 313 3,254 7,838 190,091
Education 1,071 423 1,905 4,208 341 456 8,404 266,544
Public health 206 279 216 4,894 2,662 312 8,568 220,557
Housing and utilities 0 8,710 206 0 346 194 9,457 210,728
City events 681 410 9,919 443 234 1,593 13,281 –





























on the platform betweenMay 2014 and August 2019 is ‘City Events’with 13.3 million out of
a total of 75.6 million, followed by the ‘Housing and Utilities’ and ‘Transportation’
categories.
Thematic mapping allowed us to take into account the departmental mandates and their
respective budgets when analysing the vote distribution (see Table 1). The first observation
we made is that there is no strong relationship between the financial resources at a
department’s disposal and the level of voter engagement. The ‘champions’ in terms of
posing questions that attract high numbers of votes are the departments of Housing and
Utilities, Transportation, Education, and Public Health, all characterised both by large
budgets and active use of the AC platform. By contrast, the two departments with the
largest budgets—Construction and Social Security—ran far fewer polls than the
departments mentioned above, while the departments of Culture, Sports and, in particular,
Nature Use and Environmental Protection, combine lower budgets with a high number of
participants in their polls. The Committee for Public Services, with a budget of a mere
R350 million in 2018, attracted around three million votes, more than the Department of
Construction, which has a budget of R525 billion, that is 1,500 times higher. This might
be explained by the fact that its mandate is directly related to the improvement of public
services and the use of AC.
Another noteworthy observation is that AC is most actively used in policy areas that
specialise in providing services with high client numbers, who interact frequently with the
corresponding public service, such as Housing and Utilities, Transportation, Education,
Public Health, Culture, and Sport. The Department of Social Security’s relatively low use
of AC might also be explained by the fact that most of its services are provided to elderly
people, who are statistically less represented on online platforms. Moreover, departments
that are central in determining the most tangible dimensions of city life, such as the
departments of Nature Use and Environmental Protection, and Construction, have mixed
track records, with the Department of Construction the least engaged in ‘electronic
democracy’ despite its tangible effects on daily life. Our observations can also be
supported by looking at the kinds of votes held within each policy domain.
Types of votes appearing on ‘Active Citizen’
The simple fact of voting does not provide much information on the ways citizen can
influence, or not, a given policy area. To investigate this question further, we classified
each vote and decision according to the poll type and calculated the number of votes by
poll type for the entire dataset. Despite the administration’s rhetoric, which frames AC as
a tool that allows Muscovites to ‘influence decisions at all levels of the administration’,22
most polls launched on the platform concern matters of minor importance and can be
considered inconsequential.
Of the 75.6 million total individual votes in our dataset, 23.8 million were cast in polls
about a decision on time-limited services. While some of these polls can be considered
22‘“Aktivnyi grazhdanin”’: I ty ne odin!’, Komsomol’skaya pravda, available at: https://www.kp.ru/best/
msk/aktivnyj-grazhdanin/, accessed 31 October 2019.
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consequential (for instance, the Department of Social Security’s poll on courses and training
events to be provided to young mothers or vocational school students, and the like), almost
9.9 million votes were used to decide the content of various festivals and fairs organised by
the city. While being able to choose the programming of a festival, such as the Moscow Jam
Fair, may be important for some ‘active citizens’, it does not represent a meaningful level of
digitally enabled civic participation. The same can be said about rankings. Accounting for
7.1 million votes, these polls ask users to choose the best movie theatre, doctor or teacher.
The third poll type, which we labelled ‘symbolic’, asks citizens for input on naming
various elements of the urban landscape, such as streets and metro stations, or to decide
on the visual identity of some objects, be it the colour of a new metro line or the design
of a sign to commemorate the ‘Best General Practitioner of Moscow’. While some
symbolic questions can be considered inconsequential, others have provoked major
controversies and mobilised considerable participation. In total, approximately 8.3 million
votes were cast in response to polls of this type in our period of study.
The polls concerned with the characteristics of standard, ongoing services provided by
the city administration included many questions relating to how citizens would interact
with public sector organisations and civil servants. This was part of a larger reform
process launched by Sobyanin’s administration. Since Sobyanin’s appointment, Moscow
city administration has pioneered the transformation of citizen-facing public sector
organisations to follow a service model, focusing primarily on customer experience. One
of the best examples of this is the reorganisation and merging of various post-Soviet
bureaucratic organisations, such as those delivering state IDs and passports, which had
been plagued with corruption, inefficiency and opaqueness, into multi-function service-
provision centres ‘My Documents’ (Moi dokumenty). Continuing this trend, AC polls on
services can be seen as one more tool to improve service provision and customer
satisfaction in the logic similar to private service provision. However, as we will show,
the ‘service design’ paradigm omits important dimensions of citizens’ participation in the
public governance of the corresponding policy domains.
Finally, we identified one poll type that enables civic participation in the most direct and
obvious way: by asking citizens to provide input for the establishment of rules for common
living. The Department of Transportation quite often asks citizens how parking in a given
area should be organised, whether fees should apply on the weekend, and so on. Yet, this
rule-making type of poll is the least common in our dataset, accounting for only 5.1
million votes.
Active Citizen: analysis of typical uses
PR for the city administration
Our analysis highlighted the city administration’s desire to maximise the number of users
and votes. This quest for popularity could compromise AC’s efficiency as a tool for
preference aggregation, as voting to accrue rewards brings votes from users with no
actual preferences on some issues, and many votes are thus inconsequential. The reason
for the maximisation strategy is, most probably, the need to showcase and build the
administration’s image in the eyes of publics outside Moscow. In an interview conducted
DIGITALISING CITY GOVERNANCE IN RUSSIA 1115
by one of the authors with an early developer of the AC platform, it was explicitly stated that
the platform, together with other elements of the city’s digital infrastructure, was a
significant addition to Moscow’s capacity to compete with other ‘global cities’ around the
world. For the interviewee, this competitiveness would be achieved through increased
efficiency and ‘usability’ of the city.23 However, this competition also clearly takes place
at a symbolic level, allowing the city administration to craft a narrative about its virtues
and display itself as modern, progressive and open.24 For example, the abovementioned
blockchain implementation earned AC mentions in international media without actually
resolving issues of trust and accountability. The Russian-based office of the international
professional services giant, PricewaterhouseCoopers, which provides multiple services to
the Moscow administration, published a report in which Moscow is presented among the
world’s leaders of ‘data-driven cities’, and AC is cited among the projects contributing to
this distinction.25
While it is difficult to judge whether AC has indeed contributed to Moscow’s
attractiveness in global city competitions, it is highly probable that the tokens of
Moscow’s international success were primarily used to demonstrate the city
administration’s efficiency to federal authorities. AC is frequently used to showcase
Moscow to the federal government as an internationally competitive city, as well as a
leader in developing civic participation in a controlled manner that does not threaten the
regime. This image is in line with some of the federal authorities’ strategic priorities,
since ‘state-directed civic participation in governance is central to the functioning of Putin
regime’, with an emphasis on citizens’ engagement with local authorities (Owen 2017,
p. 381). The fact that Moscow policies in the sphere of digitally enabled participation,
including AC, have been promoted by the presidential administration as a model to be
replicated in the regions shows that the carefully crafted numbers and stories framing AC
as a success have convinced the right people in the Kremlin (Sinergiyev & Bekbulatova
2016, p. 6).
AC is, however, more than a showcase for the public external to the city life. It is actively
used as an agenda-setting and PR tool addressed to Muscovites. We observed that a large
number of polls, in particular those related to time-limited decisions about events and
services, seemed to be used as a way of informing citizens about something that the
administration wants to promote. For instance, a poll can inform voters about upcoming
events by asking inconsequential questions in relation to the ‘City Events’ category.
Another similar example is a poll that promoted a new online system for fine payment by
asking whether citizens were familiar with the service. The title of this poll was ‘Service
X helps Moscow car drivers’, making its PR nature transparent. A comparable case is
when an action that has already been thoroughly planned by the administration is opened
to a plebiscite-like approval vote. With no alternative project being proposed, the
probability of the project being supported is quite high. Respondents in research
23Interview with Anton, former developer of AC platform, Moscow, 1 August 2018.
24For the discussion of ICT uses in Russia for the symbolic construction of legitimacy see Asmolov
(2014).
25‘Data-driven Cities’, PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016, available at: https://www.pwc.ru/ru/publications/
data-driven-city.html, accessed 13 September 2020.
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conducted by Horgan and Dimitrijević expressed a similar sentiment, indicating that they felt
the AC platform was being deployed to legitimise decisions that had already been made
while simulating openness around decision-making (Horgan & Dimitrijević 2019, p. 7).
It is informative to compare the policy issues brought forward by the city via the AC
platform with the issues that were most often raised by citizens in their letters and
appeals to the Moscow City Duma (2014–2019). During the same five-year period, more
than 68,300 written appeals were submitted by Moscow residents. Apart from the 16% of
appeals dealing with the functioning of the Duma, 16% were concerned with utilities and
beautification and 15% with housing, while transportation and construction both
accounted for about 7% each. Importantly, 11% were concerned with the protection of the
rights of citizens and questions of law and order.26 While these issues clearly fall within
the scope of the city administration, they do not appear on the AC platform. In contrast,
questions about arts and culture featured in only 3% of appeals, while their proportion on
the platform is significantly larger. We interpret this as another indication that AC is an
agenda-setting tool for the administration and that some relevant citizen concerns are
completely omitted on the platform.
Engagement with politicised issues
Despite the abundance of superficial polls that only nominally mobilise citizens, the city
administration also uses AC in cases in which the decision is not essentially
predetermined or inconsequential. For example, polls on symbolic issues that are easily
politicised are actively used by the administration to solicit input from citizens. The
Department of Transportation is at the forefront of mobilising citizens in this way, with
more than 3.25 million votes cast, mostly on symbolic issues. As Moscow actively
develops its transportation system, naming parts of the transport infrastructure is a city-
level decision that attracts widespread interest from citizens. In a political context in
which meaningful representation for citizens is limited, creating a forum for participation
in symbolic choices can be understood as an exercise in enhancing legitimacy. In
addition, some of these symbolic choices have been politicised. For example, one of the
most popular polls in our dataset was on ‘The choice of a tree to represent Moscow on
“Russia Alley” in Sevastopol’. Launched in the summer of 2014, a few months after the
annexation of Crimea and amid a patriotic surge, this poll carried a clear political
message by inviting citizens to reflect on the form of the symbolic tie between Moscow
and the newly annexed Sevastopol. The poll was the most popular one that year,
attracting 367,511 votes.
The use of polls to determine symbolic matters as a quest for legitimacy faces, however,
serious limitations. The best example of this is the renaming of the metro station
Voikovskaya. Petr Voikov was a Soviet revolutionary, later one of the first Soviet
diplomats, and took part in the execution of the Romanov family—according to some
accounts, enthusiastically. Yet, because of the absence of definitive historical evidence, the
26‘Informatsiya ob obrashcheniyakh grazhdan’, Moskovskaya gorodskaya Duma, available at: https://
duma.mos.ru/ru/submenu/198, accessed 13 September 2020.
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interpretations of his role in Russian history are conflicting (Mikhailov & Salyaeva 2016). In
2015, the city administration launched a poll on AC asking whether the station needed a new
name, which resulted in the controversial decision to keep the old name. Removing Voikov’s
name from Moscow’s toponyms had been supported by many human right and opposition
activists for a long time, and many opposition politicians, including Alexey Naval’nyi,
were convinced that the poll results were manipulated.27 While we are not in a position to
know if any tampering took place and found no conclusive study of the case, it is important
to note that there were no signs that the administration had been in favour of keeping the
old name. Moreover, not only opposition activists but also the Russian Orthodox Church,
the political weight of which is unquestionable, were in favour of renaming. Instead of
focusing on the controversy around the alleged vote manipulation, we suggest seeing it as a
demonstration of the limits of potential uses for AC votes. When used to address questions
with explicit political dimensions, based on conflicting interpretations and perceptions of
past or present events, AC can easily become the target of criticism. In the context of a
general decline of fora for conflicting opinions, the legitimacy of an instrument such as AC
has been difficult to defend. The Voikovskaya controversy led to a questioning of the role
and trustworthiness of AC and ended up significantly eroding the legitimacy of the
platform, showing that in an atmosphere of deadlocked political debate, a digital voting
platform cannot be expected to settle the disagreement.
(Dis)empowerment of certain stakeholders
Another use for the AC platform has been to shuffle the balance of power by disempowering
certain stakeholders. Polls concerned with urban planning and material infrastructure
provide a prime illustration of this use. While this policy domain seems like a perfect fit
for improving the quality of governance through citizen participation, the track record of
AC usage is, at best, mixed. The cases in which powerful actors were able to influence
policymaking through informal and non-public channels appear as the most contentious in
this context. This hypothesis can be illustrated by the case of the much-criticised
Renovation programme launched by Sobyanin in 2017. The programme aimed at
replacing the old housing stock—mainly, Khrushchev-era five-storey apartment buildings
—with new buildings, while offering the owners of the demolished apartments a new
property.28 While some of the buildings targeted by the programme were indeed
dilapidated, others were not. Many analysts believe that the scale of the programme was
due to concerted actions of Moscow’s construction industry lobby, which has a close
connection to the city administration (Smyth 2018). The programme also clashed with the
desire of some apartment owners to keep their property and to stop the demolition of
their buildings.
According to the Housing Code—the federal legislation in force at the time—the decision
to include a building in the Renovation programme had to be made by the general meeting of
27‘“Aktivnyi grazhdanin”: ne tol’ko fiktsiya, no i ugolovnoe prestuplenie’, Leonid Volkov, 26 November
2015, available at: https://www.leonidvolkov.ru/p/86/, accessed 28 May 2021.
28See Khmelnitskaya and Ihalainen in this issue.
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the owners of the apartments. These meetings are held in person, require attendance of at
least half of residents entitled to participate in decision-making, and imply in-person
discussions and votes. By a local legislative act,29 the city administration included a vote
on AC as an option for decision-making, suggesting that a vote via the platform is a
substitute for a face-to-face general meeting. Many testimonies suggest that such a use of
AC had an impact on the voting results (Horgan & Dimitrijević 2019). Indeed, it
excluded institutionalised forms of collective deliberation and reduced the procedure to a
yes/no vote. According to an interview with one apartment owner who mobilised against
his home being included in the renovation, face-to-face communication was essential to
secure the majority’s opposition to the demolition, in the context of the city
administration’s frenetic PR effort in favour of the renovation.30 Additionally, people who
were unable to vote on the platform were invited to vote at the ‘My Documents’ offices
where, allegedly, they were encouraged to vote for the renovation. Finally, the voices of
those who did not vote were to be counted as cast in favour of renovation. While this
practice was eventually deemed problematic and abandoned,31 it reveals the pro-renovation
bias in the administration’s actions. One can be quite confident in saying that the AC
platform did not elaborate a fair and accountable decision-making process, and actually
reduced citizens’ capacity to exercise their property rights, as also reported by Horgan and
Dimitrijević (2019). Construction has conventionally been dominated by developers who
maintain close relationships with the administration. The introduction of a digital voting
tool in this case was instrumental to further increasing the power of the construction
industry. A comparable observation can be made in the case of public hearings carried out
via AC, which bypass traditional channels of deliberation and consequently disempower
citizens through a reduction in the quality of their participation.
Channelling citizen input in decision-making
While the example of Sobyanin’s Renovation programme reveals the potential for the
reconfiguring of governance networks in favour of organised interests, the city
administration has used AC in a way that is aimed at channelling citizens’ input into the
policymaking process. This has been particularly true in the case of polls on the rules of
common living. Even though this use of AC is not as frequent as the others, it has been
regularly deployed by various departments. Many of these polls are concerned with
situations in which the proposed rule is intended to deal with something annoying, dirty
or dangerous, such as noise during renovation works in apartments, night deliveries to
stores, dog owners not cleaning up after their dogs, and the accessibility of cocktails
blending alcohol and energy drinks. Most of these situations require restricting individual
29‘Postanovleniye Pravitel’stva Moskvy ot 2 maya 2017 goda N 245-PP Ob uchete mneniya naseleniya po
proektu renovatsii zhilishchnogo fonda v gorode Moskve (s izmeneniyami na 14 iyunya 2017 goda)’,
available at: https://docs.cntd.ru/document/456061231, accessed 28 May 2021.
30Interview with Vladimir, apartment owner, Moscow, 2 August 2018.
31‘Golosa “molchunov” po programme renovatsii budut uchityvat’ proportsional’no—Sobyanin’,
Kompleks gradostroitel’noi politiki i stroitel’stva goroda Moskvy, 2 June 2017, available at: https://stroi.
mos.ru/news/golosa-molchunov-po-proghrammie-rienovatsii-budut-uchityvat-proportsional-no-sobianin,
accessed 28 May 2021.
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liberties for the sake of the common good. We suggest that the administration understands
these polls as a way to secure popular support for restrictive measures.
However, these polls, quite often, cannot be seen as the administration seeking to
accommodate the aggregated preferences of its citizens. In some cases, the polls put in
opposition an active minority with strong opinions seeking change and the general
population, indifferent to a given issue and supporting the default option offered by city
administration. Two issues are emblematic here: the removal of dead leaves and the care
of grass. Those preferring ‘wild’ unmown lawns—not standard practice in Moscow—
represent an active community, with groups on social media. They are also opposed to the
removal of dead leaves in autumn. However, polls to waive the requirement for the
removal of dead leaves have never succeeded on AC (Golunov 2018). While those in
favour of removing leaves do not form a community in the same way that those in favour
of letting them lie do, the majority acceptance of the status quo has helped the
administration maintain this costly and controversial practice. While in the case of grass
mowing, some blocks voted in favour of ‘wild’ lawns, the use of AC helped the city
administration to legitimise its preferred routine in most districts.
In many polls on public services organisations, the image of a monolithic city
administration providing services and taking citizens’ preferences into account is
misleading. As the governance context in sectors such as public health and education is
one of administration-led reform, AC can be seen as a tool that the administration uses, at
least in some cases, in its quest to increase its control over professionals in these sectors
providing public services. The case of the school holiday schedule is illustrative. In 2014,
the Department of Education launched a poll, ‘Choosing a unified holiday schedule for
Moscow’s schoolchildren’, asking parents to choose between the ‘module’, ‘quarter’ or
‘trimester’ holiday schedule. The status quo before the vote was that the schools were
able to choose their own schedule. While the majority used the traditional ‘quarter’
system, some had adopted a ‘module’ system with shorter, more frequent breaks. Those
opposed to the vote emphasised that the proposed ‘unification’ jeopardised this form of
school autonomy, as well as being illegal. One interview subject, a teacher from a school
that had adopted the ‘module’ system years before the vote, testified that the vote was
seen by the school administration as an attempt to force them, and other schools, to
abandon the new system.32 Another interviewee, the mother of a schoolboy from a school
using the ‘module’ system, reported being anxious about the system being changed.33
Moreover, votes were spread quite evenly for the two most popular options: the ‘module’
and the ‘quarter’ system. The Department of Education decreed that schools would be
able to decide between the two. As a result, the ‘module’ system has spread to almost
half of Moscow’s schools.34 Another mother interviewed had pushed for the adoption of
the ‘module’ system when her son went to a new school using the ‘quarter’ system and
was eventually successful.35 What we see is that the Department of Education did not
32Phone interview with Karina, Moscow, 8 June 2020.
33Phone interview with Elena, Moscow, 11 June 2020.
34‘Pochti polovina stolichnykh shkol pereidet na modul’nuyu sistemu obucheniya’, Moskva24, 10 April
2015, available at: https://www.m24.ru/articles/shkoly/10042015/70858, accessed 1 September 2020.
35Phone interview with Olga, Moscow, 8 June 2020.
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achieve its initial plan of unification and adopted a more diverse approach instead, a decision
clearly influenced by the poll outcome.
Citizen responses to the use of ‘Active Citizen’
The story of the school holiday schedule did not end with the 2015 decision to let the schools
choose. A few years later, the department decided to make some adjustments to the ‘module’
system that required reducing the duration of holidays. No vote on AC was planned this time.
However, many parents were disappointed. A petition against the modification, launched by
parents on the change.org platform, gathered more than 100,000 signatures.36 The petition
insisted that the ‘module’ system had been voted for on the AC platform and should not
be modified. Three out of five most popular comments under the petition stressed the
argument that the system parents voted for should not be changed in a top-down manner.
The protest succeeded, and schools were left free to decide on how to manage the
‘module’ system. This story shows us that AC, as an instrument, plays an even larger role
than that envisioned by the administration. While the possibility of influencing the
decision-making and policymaking processes can sometimes be limited by AC, citizens
have seized the opportunities that the tool provides and tried to create new ones.
Furthermore, citizens can, within the limits of the system, provide input. This capacity is
especially valuable when there is a social movement or mass mobilisation associated with
the issue. Even if incentivisation and possible manipulations affect the poll, the large
volume of genuine votes cannot go unnoticed. When the public hearings for a very large
construction project in the Moscow district of Zuyzino were moved to AC under the
pretext of the COVID-19 pandemic, a local grassroots politics veteran, Konstantin
Yankauskas, wrote a detailed analysis, critiquing the decrease in the quality of democracy
due to the use of AC.37 He was among the advocates for a petition against the AC being
used in such a way. At the same time, he encouraged all the district’s inhabitants to
participate in the public hearing via AC. This example, as well as that of the school
holiday schedule, reveals two key paths for genuine citizen input through AC. First,
citizens use the platform while being aware of its imperfections and sometimes even
obtain meaningful results. Second, in a related process, a poorly organised poll on the
platform or even the lack of a poll can serve as an impetus for citizen mobilisation and
provide an extra argument for an official request to be heard. In this way, one could claim
that the general contours of AC’s design and function makes civic empowerment an
almost unintended consequence of the platform’s diverse set of uses.
Concluding remarks
The goal of this essay has been to make an empirical contribution to the understanding of the
possible roles of civic tech in contemporary Russian governance by providing an analysis of
36‘Izmenit’ prinyatyi na 2018–2019 uchebnyi god grafik modul’nykh kanikul na staryi!’, available at:
https://www.change.org/p/изменить-принятый-на-2018-2019-учебный-год-график-модульных-каникул-
на-старый, accessed 1 September 2020.
37Post on Konstantin Yankauskas’s Facebook page, 7 April 2020, available at: https://www.facebook.com/
konstantin.jankauskas/posts/10221869096147169, accessed 1 May 2020.
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polls on the Active Citizen platform and their diverse uses. Our first objective was to analyse
the substance of and the process behind the polls on the AC platform. We found that at the
city-wide level, most polls held via AC are inconsequential, and of these, the most
consequential concern the public services sector.
Our second objective was to explore the main uses of the AC platform. Our analysis
identified five repeated uses. AC plays a role in showcasing Moscow’s status as a global
and modern city, leading to the administration’s concern over the number of users and
votes, which is ultimately detrimental to the quality of preference aggregation. In
addition, while AC has been used experimentally to make decisions on highly
politicised issues, it has neither settled these issues nor contributed to building
legitimacy for the government’s preferred option. Even more problematically, some uses
of AC, rather than empowering Muscovites, reduce their capacity to defend their
property or influence their immediate living environment via participation in public
hearings. Other uses permit Muscovites to vote on rules of common living and decide
on the operation of some public services. While these uses of AC are often motivated
by the administration’s desire to curtail the influence of some actors, such as activist
groups or professionals in public education and health, the votes do occasionally
increase the capacity of citizens to influence matters that they care about. This capacity
—and again, only in some cases—emerges nevertheless as an unintended consequence
of the administration’s use of AC.
Our analysis suggests that it would be misleading to see the AC platform as a direct
response to a demand for more citizen participation or as experimentation with direct
democracy. Instead, the platform is used in multiple ways, so its effects on civic
participation can only be understood within the larger context of its application. Yet, we
discovered that AC as a digital instrument of civic participation has a significantly
different effect on governance than offline participatory formats. Government promotion
of offline civic participation in Russia has clearly led to a greater opening of governance
networks and policy change as one intended consequence. In contrast, AC often
reproduces and reinforces local governance practices that exist offline in Moscow and
helps consolidate the central place of the administration in governance networks. Also,
our study provides limited evidence in support of the idea that digital tools can have a
negative effect on the quality of participation. Importantly, this is not a technologically
determined claim, as the administration’s modus operandi suffices to explain such an
effect (Deseriis 2020). But, to end on an optimistic note, the city administration’s control
of the platform is not ubiquitous. Even its tightly controlled participation format has
created unintended channels for civic engagement.
Our study leaves some questions unanswered. Perhaps the most interesting is whether AC
could be an indirect vehicle for Muscovite civic engagement, helping them to take a more
active posture vis-à-vis local governance. As in the case of the proposed changes to the
school holiday schedule, the very fact of voting on AC has potential for further
mobilisation. Understanding the motivations and evolving identities of AC users is, thus,
a question of great interest. Can the ‘incentivised’ voter, opening the app only to claim
bonuses, encounter a question on which they have a strong opinion, vote, become
dissatisfied with the result and seek new channels to make their voice heard? One cannot
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exclude this possibility. A vote, even a casual one, always has the possibility of being a
critical turning point towards civic engagement or the beginning of a wave of civic activity.
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